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ABSTRACT 
There is a certain arrogance in the affirmation that a “European model” of regional integration 
and of compliance with international law should be adopted anywhere in the world, and in Asia 
in  particular.  This  article argues  on the  contrary that  Asia  and  Europe are  in  fundamentally 
different situations vis-à-vis international law. Based on an analysis of recent events and latest 
legal developments in Europe, it puts the “European model” of regional integration and the 
European selective compliance with international law in perspective with regard to the Asian 
context.  Without  denying  that  “civilizations”  should  learn  from  one  another  and  that  the 
European experience may be relevant to some extent in Asia, this article concludes that the tools 
developed in Europe should be used differently in Asia. 
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The “European Model” of International 
Law and its Significance for Asia: Some 
Critical Reflections 
 
BENOÎT MAYER 
1 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
Does  the  European  model  of  regional  integration 
continue to hold sway? Over the last years, European 
states have failed to take a common position on the 
American  invasion  of  Iraq,  disagreed  on  an  EU-led 
military  intervention  in  Libya
2 and,  lately,  did  not 
appear united during the grim days of the euro  zone 
sovereign  debt  crisis.  Disillusion  has  replaced  the 
optimistic mood of the early 1990s, when it see med 
that Europe  would further integrate, speak with one 
voice as represented by the European Union (EU) and 
could thrive as an equal  counterpart to the United 
States. Lately, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty and the Council 
of  Europe’s  fourteenth  Protocol  to  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  were  only  extracted 
after long and difficult negotiations. Externally, the EU 
has increasingly been criticised for unilaterally seeking 
to  impose  its  positions  to  the  rest  of  the world,  in 
particular  on  questions  such  as  human  rights  and 
environmental  protection.  Most  recently,  on  21 
December  2011,  the  European  Court  of  Justice 
validated  the  extension  of  the  EU  Emission  Trade 
Scheme  to  aviation  activities,  although  it  was 
fervently  denounced  by  EU  partners  such  as  China, 
India  as  a  “unilateral”  initiative.  In  these 
circumstances,  what  do  Asian  states  think  of  the 
“European model” now? 
                                                      
1 Benoît Mayer, LLM (McGill), MA Political Science (Sciences 
Po), BCL (Sorbonne), is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Law, 
National University of Singapore. His dissertation discusses the 
alternative justifications for an international legal protection of 
climate  change  induced  migrants.  Benoit  is  also  an  active 
research  fellow  at  the  Center  for  International  Sustainable 
Development  Law  (Montreal,  Canada)  and  at  Earth  System 
Governance  (Lund,  Sweden)  and  a  member  of  the  editorial 
board of the Canadian Journal of Poverty Law.  
The views expressed in this working paper are that of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions or 
organisations that they represent, or of the EU Centre in 
Singapore. 
2 Ana Gomes. Was Eufor Libya an April fool's joke? EU OBSERVER, 13 
Jul. 2011.  
Regional  integration  is  not  to  be  understood  in 
isolation  from  the  broader  world. Regional  law and 
global law maintain existential but complex relations. 
At the outset, at least, regional integration was based 
on cosmopolitan theories: region-building was a first 
step,  between  like-minded  states,  to  trigger  larger 
international  cooperation  across  civilizations.
3 In the 
words of the European fed eralists gathered in the 
1948 Hague Congress, for instance, “the creation of a 
United  Europe  [was]  an  essential  element  in  the 
creation  of  a  united  world”.
4 Likewise,  Schuman 
started his 1950 Declaration by declaring that “[t]he 
contribution which an organized and living Europe can 
bring  to  civilization  is  indispensable  to  the 
maintenance  of  peaceful  relations”.
5 Going further, 
Churchill argued in a 1946 speech in Zurich that the 
European experience was to contribute to a universal 
model of regional “groupings,” accordingly essential 
to the construction of a righteous world order: 
 
There  is  no  reason  why  a  regional  organization  of 
Europe  should  in  any  way  conflict  with  the  world 
organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, I 
believe that the larger synthesis will only survive if it is 
founded  upon  coherent  natural  groupings.  There  is 
already a natural grouping in the Western hemisphere. 
We  British  have  our  own  Commonwealth  of  Nations. 
These do not weaken, on the contrary they strengthen, 
the  world  organization.  They  are  in  fact  its  main 
support. And why should there not be a European group 
which  could  give  a  sense  of  enlarged  patriotism  and 
common  citizenship  to  the  distracted  peoples  of  this 
turbulent and mighty continent? And why should it not 
take its rightful place  with  other great  groupings and 
help to shape the onward destinies of men?
6 
 
Regional integration, it would appear from the above 
pronouncements,  was  based  on  ideas  of  the 
                                                      
3 The Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights, for 
instance, reflects the intention of the European states to “take the 
first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights 
stated  in  the  Universal  Declaration.”  See  Convention  for  the 
Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms,  5
th 
recital, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
4 Political Resolution of the Hague Congress (7–10 May 1948), art. 
14, reproduced in CVCE, 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/Political_Resolution_of_the_Hague_Con
gress_7_10_May_1948-en-15869906-97dd-4c54-ad85-
a19f2115728b.html  
5 The Schuman Declaration  (Paris, 9 May 1950), reproduced on 
CVCE, 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/The_Schuman_Declaration_Paris_9_May
_1950-en-9cc6ac38-32f5-4c0a-a337-9a8ae4d5740f.html 
6   Address  given by Winston Churchil l  (Zurich, 19 Sep. 1946), 
reproduced on Council of Europe,  
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/AboutUs/zurich_e.htm  EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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Enlightenment,  in  particular  the  ideas  of 
cosmopolitanism and progress. At the outset of the 
notion  of  a  European  integration  lies  Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism. Kant’s second definitive article for a 
perpetual peace stated that “[t]he law of nations shall 
be founded on a federation of free states”.
7 On this 
premise, Europe had developed international law as a 
tool  for  peace.  After  World  War  II,  peace  was 
conceived broadly: primarily as the absence of violent 
conflicts between states, but to some extent also, 
positively, as the development of friendly relations 
and cooperation between nations.
8 
 
Western  thinkers  generally  conceived  international 
law as a one -way linear process along the path of 
progress. No return to previous states of nature (i.e. 
anarchy in international relations theory) was allowed. 
Indeed,  this  rat chet  effect  is  reflected  by  the 
definition of the three main sources of international 
law (as defined by the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice). The first source of international law, 
the treaties, is, according to the Vienna Convention on 
the  Law  of  Treaties  (as  a  general  rule  subject  to 
exceptions)  “not  subject  to  denunciation  or 
withdrawal”.
9  The  second  source,  international 
customs, consists of general practices accepted as law. 
Customs  are  antithetical  to  the  notion  of  a 
renunciation. Arguably, they can solely be  amended 
by  another  customary  norm  or  by  a  conventional 
norm. Lastly, the third source of international law, the 
“general  principles  of  law  recognized  by  civilized 
nations,”  are  meant  to  add  to  each  other,  not  to 
terminate at any time.
10 In this cultural context, the 
“small steps” of regional integration were conceived, 
in Europe, as a good to the international community, 
a  way  to  encourage  incremental  progress  of 
international  law,  to  move  the  international 
community  toward  an  international  social  contract. 
Small steps can prosper as long as they keep heading 
toward the same direction. 
 
In  this  Western  construction  of  international  law, 
however, Asia and, more generally, the Third World, 
remained  at  the  periphery,  generally  as  passive 
receptors of a model often imposed upon them. The 
                                                      
7 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795) 
second definitive article. 
8 See, for instance, Charter of the United Nations, art. 1, 26 June 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153. 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56, 26 May 1959, 
1155 UNTS 331. 
10 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), in annex 
of the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 8. 
Westphalian  model of  international  legal order  was 
imposed  worldwide  through  colonialism  and  other 
forms  of  unequal  civilizational  encounters. 
International  legal  personality  was  conferred 
exclusively  to  states
11 and statehood, a fruit of the 
Western  modernity,
12  was  precisely  denied  to 
colonized  peoples.  After  World  War  II,  however, 
decolonized states were slowly admitted into the UN. 
All  states  were  progressively  conferred  equal 
sovereignty – South Sudan and China alike – and were 
conceived  as  analogous  entities  possessing  a 
Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
over their jurisdiction. In law, at least, all states are 
born  and  remain  equal  in  rights  and  duties;  all 
contribute  assumedly  in  the  same  way  to  defining 
international rules; and all have the same obligation 
of compliance to international law. In fact, however, 
the Third World was knocking at the closed doors of 
international law but it often remained ignored. 
 
At the same time as Third World states strive to be 
recognized as genuinely equals, the relations between 
regional  integration  and  international  law  are 
questioned.  Critiques  of  a  European  “unilateralism” 
argue that, in our post-modern 21
st century, regional 
integration  should  mainly  be  understood  as  a 
challenge  to  international  law.  In  a  neo-realist 
perspective,  regional  integration  is  a  means  to 
another end: defending regional models in a would-be 
inevitable  “clash  of  civilizations”.
13  Instead  of  a 
contemporary or a smaller replica of Kant’s universal 
federation  of  free  states,  Europe  would  accordingly 
become a fortress of self-centred peoples, a defensive 
union  in  a  generally  anarchical  world  where  each 
region becomes a closed bloc and competition shifts 
from the national to the regional level. Although the 
Titanic project of international law was conceived as 
unsinkable,  it  would  have  been  challenged  and 
betrayed by regional law. The apocalyptic “autumn of 
international law”
14 is announced. 
 
The betrayal probably started at the very outset of 
European integration. European integration started at 
                                                      
11  Later,  legal  personality  was  extended  to  international 
organizations of states. See: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 
179 (11 Apr.). 
12 See Kenneth H.F. Dyson. The State Tradition in Western Europe: 
A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford University Press, 1980). 
13 On the interpretation of Huntington’s theory as neo-realist, see 
for instance: Richard E. Rubenstein & Jarle Crocker, Challenging 
Huntington (1994) 96 Foreign Policy 113. 
14 Prabhakar Singh,  International Law as an Intimate Enemy, 17 
Afr. Y.B. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2009) (abstract). EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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the very time when the Iron Curtain descended upon 
Europe, and for several decades the European project 
was  propelled  by  the  constant  anxiety  to  contain 
Communism. In the words of a Belgian ambassador in 
1948, “what we want before all [...] is to act quickly 
with  the  goal  of  integrating  without  delay  Western 
Germany  in  the  Western  bloc”.
15  The  European 
Economic Community was established less than two 
years after the Warsaw Pact. At the time, constructing 
the  European  project  as  a  reaction  to  communism 
was  legitimized  as  self-defensive.  When  the  Iron 
curtain  was  torn  away,  idealist  hopes  were  raised: 
could  Europe,  at  last,  focus  exclusively  on  its 
cosmopolitan  project?  Yet,  the  last  two  decades 
constantly disillusioned such hopes. As conflicts arose 
between European law and international norms, the 
European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  renounced  to  the 
systematic primacy of the latter. In the words of the 
critical General Court, the ECJ 
 
Regarded the constitutional framework created by the 
EC  Treaty  as  a  wholly  autonomous  legal  order,  not 
subject to the higher rules of international law– in this 
case the law deriving from the Charter of the United 
Nations.
16 
 
The Euro-centric debate about the relation between 
Europe and international law certainly concerns Asia, 
and Asia should play a role in this debate. After all, 
speaking  about  the  foundations  of  regionalist 
movements,  Asia  and  Europe  speak  a  common 
language,  although  certainly  different  dialects.  The 
need  to  conceive  a  way  to  live  together  is  shared 
universally. Everywhere in Eurasia as elsewhere, the 
relations between direct neighbours and partners are 
of special importance, for transnational cooperation is 
facilitated by similar civilizational traits and common 
interests.  With  the  exception  of  rising  powers  like 
China or India, most Asian states see in international 
law in general, and in regional integration in particular, 
a  shield  against  unilateral  actions  by  greater 
geopolitical powers. Additionally, Asian states try to 
use  international  law  as  a  shield  against  the 
pursuance  of  asymmetrical,  post-colonial  relations. 
For superpowers, international law provides the rules 
necessary  for  the  stability  and  prosperity  of  an 
                                                      
15 Letter  from  Jules  Guillaume  to  Paul-Henri  Spaak  (Paris,  15 
October 1948), reproduced in CVCE,   
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/letter_from_jules_guillaume_to_paul_he
nri_spaak_paris_15_october_1948-en-789c117d-9dd5-4c3c-9e82-
cc7e083e1a65.html  
16 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649 
[hereinafter Kadi-I CFI], para. 119. 
interdependent  world.  Yet  it  is  notable  that 
transnational cooperation in Europe and in Asia has 
followed different paths. 
 
European integration has often been cited as a model 
that other regions should follow. Yet, as it is perceived 
that  the  European  project  is  stalling,  in  Asia  where 
regional experiments are taking place, doubts about 
the European model has deepened. Certainly, on the 
mono-dimensional  scale  of  a  European  model  for 
regional integration, the Asian experiments did not go 
far  enough,  and  the  creation  of  supranational 
institutions  is  simply  inconceivable.  Applying 
European standards of regional institutions to assess 
Asia’s transnational achievements would certainly be 
unproductive.  Other  forms  of  transnational 
cooperation are possible. Asian governments do not 
have to comply with European premises. Cultural and 
circumstantial  elements,  among  others,  may  invite 
completely  different  forms  of  transnational 
cooperation, even though some needs and goals are 
probably  analogous.  As  Panikkar  already  recalled  in 
1982, “[n]o culture, tradition, ideology or religion can 
today  speak  for  the  whole  of  humankind,  let  alone 
solve its problems.” Asia’s own path toward regional 
cooperation may even  influence the  European way, 
for, as Panikkar goes on, “[d]ialogue and intercourse 
leading  to  a  mutual  fecundation  are  necessary”.
17 
Transnational  law  in  Asia  may  develop  alternative 
sources  to  treaties  and  customs;  “gentlemen’s 
agreements”,  in  particular,  probably  play  a  greater 
role in Asia than in Europe, along with diverse forms 
of non-formally binding declarations.  
 
Such differences of approach may even be necessary, 
for the premise of transnational cooperation in Asia 
and  in  Europe  are  not  identical.  From  the  outset, 
Europe  included  two  great  regional  powers  (France 
and Germany), each of which could be balanced by 
the combination of smaller countries (Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands). In contrast, in East 
Asia and South Asia, the (European) legal fiction that 
states are equal and sovereign may appear just too 
artificial  given  the  greater  differences  in  size  and 
power between states and the incapacity of smaller 
nations to weight against India or China.  Even more 
than  the  differences  in  size  and  power,  is  the 
differences  in  historical  and  cultural  experiences.  In 
Northeast Asia, one of the least integrated regions in 
the world (at least formally), how could South Korea 
                                                      
17 R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? 
30:120 DIOGENES 75, 75 (1982). EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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and Japan not become bogged within China’s power, 
or how could China agree to treat its neighbours fully 
as equals – as the legal fiction of equally sovereign 
states demands? 
 
In  addressing  all  these  different  issues,  the  present 
paper  aims  at  analysing  the  significance  of  recent 
trends in European integration for the Asian region. 
There  are  however  strong  limitations  to  any 
comparison between “Europe” and “Asia.” The latter 
region, even more than the former, is ill-defined. As a 
geographical  entity,  its  borders  are  blurred.  As  a 
cultural  or  civilizational  entity,  also,  its  unity  is 
uncertain, to say the least. Asia is mostly a negative 
concept:  as  Ruskola  recalled,  the  notion  of  Asia, 
developed by Europeans, “stands for little more than 
not  being  Europe”.
18 Broadly  defined,  Asia  includes 
almost  two  thirds  of  the  world’s  population  and 
countries as different and as literally far apart as Saudi 
Arabia and Japan. This paper focuses on the Eastern 
part of the giant continent: Northeast Asia, Southeast 
Asia  and  South  Asia.  This  region  remains  however 
extremely  broad  and  heterogeneous.  Regional 
integration  in  Asia  occurs  within  sub-continental 
groupings  such  as  ASEAN  and  the  South  Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), rather 
than at the whole Asian level. 
 
Moreover, any comparison has its inherent limitations 
and it is a two-way process. Although concentrating 
on the sole influence of Europe on Asia (and not on 
the  reverse  movement),  this  paper  also  recognises 
that  Europe’s  strong  institutions  are  not  the  only 
possible  model  for  intergovernmental  cooperation. 
Just  as  a  different  constitution  is  necessary  for  a 
different country, it is natural that models of regional 
cooperation,  while  influencing  each  other,  will 
maintain  key  differences,  reflecting  the  different 
regional settings. 
 
The  following  discussion  is  structured  around  two 
existential  questions  in  the  context  of  the  constant 
redefinition of the European model -  internally, (i.e. 
within the integrating regions, the EU’s perceived lack 
of  unity  questions  the  assumption  that  European 
integration could be an influential model for regional 
integration  elsewhere,  in  particular  in  Asia)  and 
externally, (i.e. in the relation between the integrating 
regions and the larger world, the EU’s perceived lack 
                                                      
18 Teemu  Ruskola,  Where  Is  Asia?  When  Is  Asia?  Theorizing 
Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 879, 
882 (2011). 
of compliance with international law interrogates the 
notion  that  Asia  should  necessarily  comply  with 
international law). 
 
II.  The  limits  of  the  European  model  of 
regional integration in Asia 
 
The EU is often referred to as a model for successful 
regional integration. In comparison, Asia is too often 
viewed  as  failing  to  reproduce  the  European 
successes.
19 Even ASEAN, often considered the best 
sub-regional achievement in Asia, has not been able 
to establish any form of regional  judicial body that 
could stand a comparison with the European Court of 
Justice or the European Court on Human Rights, or 
even, beyond Europe, with the Inter -American Court 
on Human Rights or the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. No elected body represents the Asian 
nations  in  any  manner  similar  to  the  European 
Parliament,  nor  does  any  sub-governmental  body 
gather individuals nominated by Asian governments in 
a way similar to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. ASEAN and SAARC consist solely of 
summits,  councils  and  committees  and  inter-
governmental meetings with substantially less formal 
institutions. No Asian organization has a bureaucracy 
that can be compared to the European Commission 
with  more  than  20,000  civil  servants.  While 
acknowledging  the  different  circumstances  in  Asia, 
there is also a strong belief that regional integration 
can  only  be  achieved  with  legalistic  and  formal 
institutions like in the EU.   
 
The  present  section  argues  that  such  oft-heard 
arguments do not hold much water. More specifically, 
this argument is based on two fragile premises. Firstly, 
it  assumes  that  Europe  has  achieved  a  successful 
model  of  regional  integration.  Of  course  some 
nuances may appear from one discourse to the other. 
For  instance,  few  authors  would  consider  the 
                                                      
19 There are many examples of such assertions in academic papers 
as in mainstream media, so that the examples can only be chosen 
arbitrary. Some of them include: C.H. Kwan, Yen Block: Toward 
Economic  Integration  in  Asia,  xiii  (2001)  (identifying  “the 
introduction of the Euro in Europe” as an instrumental factor in 
arousing  “active  discussions”  on  the  need  of  a  reform  of  the 
financial  architecture  of  Asia);  Ray  Barrell  and  Amanda  Choy, 
Economic  Integration  and  Openness  in  Europe  and  East  Asia 
(2003); Hwee Kwan Chow & Yoonbai Kim, A common currency peg 
in  East  Asia?  Perspectives  from  Western  Europe,  25  Journal  of 
Macroeconomics  331  (2003);  Mark  Beeson,  Rethinking 
regionalism:  Europe  and  East  Asia  in  comparative  historical 
perspective, 12, Journal of European Public 969 (2005). EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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European  model  of  integration  as  completely 
successful, or the Asian one as a complete failure. Yet, 
it  remains  a  commonly  accepted  conception  that 
European integration, when compared with Asian, has 
been a relative success. Second, the discourse on the 
EU’s  “model”  of  regional  integration  also  assumes 
that  the  conditions  for  a  successful  regional 
integration are analogous in Asia and in Europe, so 
that  the  success  of  regional  integration  in  Europe 
could be transplanted to Asia. Here again, some may 
add nuances to the analogy between Asia and Europe, 
but  the  somewhat  condescending  attitude,  which 
some may regard as “neo-colonialist”, remains central: 
accordingly, Asia has to learn from Europe.  
 
Yet  objections  can  be  addressed  to  both  of  these 
assumptions. On the one hand, Asia  does not have 
much to envy with regard to European integration (A). 
On  the  other  hand,  significant  differences  appear 
between the circumstances of regional cooperation in 
Europe and Asia (B). 
 
A.  Reassessing  the  success  of  European 
integration 
 
A  first  objection  is  that  Europe  has  never  fully 
achieved a model of regional integration. Alternatively, 
the  theoretical  “European  model  of  regional 
integration”  was  never  fully  implemented.  After  all, 
the  history  of  the  European  Communities  is  full  of 
hurdles  that  were  not  cleared  without  significant 
concessions  on  the  European  federalist  project.  For 
example, one of these crises occurred in 1965, when 
French  president  de  Gaulle  recalled  the  French 
Permanent  Representative  in  Brussels  to  protest 
against budgetary reforms and also the application of 
the majority voting in the Council of Ministers. This 
crisis  was  solved  the  following  year  through  an 
extraordinary  Council  meeting  in  Luxembourg,  but 
only  at  the  cost  of  a  detrimental  precedent  on  the 
procedure for decision-making in the Council. Taking 
note  of  “different  views”  about  the  obligation  to 
negotiate before taking a controversial decision in the 
Council, the final communiqué of 1966 in fact allows a 
state to veto a decision that, it considers of a “vital 
importance”
20 for its national interests. The rule that 
European  law  makers  cautiously  kept  out  of  any 
                                                      
20 Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the Council  
(Luxembourg,  29  January  1966),  reproduced  in  CVCE, 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_extraordinar
y_session_of_the_council_luxembourg_29_january_1966-en-
abe9e77d-9bf9-4e0a-90a9-b80cb48efb47.html  
treaty remains a sword of Damocles hanging over any 
European  negotiation  –  the  possibility  (at  least 
theoretical,  if  rarely  implemented)  for  any  state,  at 
any time, to prevent a decision. It certainly does not 
apply  to all  countries  in  the  same  way;  smallest or 
least  influential  member  states  are  unlikely  to  risk 
playing the same game. Yet, for decisions on issues 
such  as  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  the 
agreement of a few influential states remains, in fact, 
necessary.  
 
Beside procedural issues, Europe has not yet met the 
expectations of the federalist movements in the late 
1940s.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  striking  contrast 
between German reunification and the accession of 
Central  and  Eastern  European  States  to  the  EU.  In 
Germany,  political  “reunification”  was  a  matter  of 
months and the federal government invested massive 
funds to foster development in the reunified Eastern 
Länder.  By  contrast,  the  accession  of  12  member 
states to the EU took one and a half decades. Even 
after  the  accession  of  the  new  Central  and  Eastern 
European  Member  States,  derogatory  conditions 
included in the treaties of accession were applied for 
nearly a decade, curtailing the fundamental freedoms 
of new European citizens and limiting the benefit of 
their states under pre-existing structural and cohesion 
funds.  Germany,  on  the  one  hand,  is  a  strong 
imagined community, whose members are capable of 
ambitious sacrifices for the sake of each other, as has 
recently  been  tested.  The  EU,  on  the  other  hand, 
remains  little  more  than  an  inter-governmental 
organization,  whose  policies  are  guided  by  national 
interests rationally assessed and negotiated by each 
of its member states. Again, most recently, the failure 
of  Europe  to  establish  a  genuine  transnational 
solidarity has been displayed, during the “euro crisis,” 
by the incapacity to take sufficiently strong measures 
early enough. Similarly, the reform of EU primary law 
has failed to lead to a genuine European debate, and 
the  election  of  the  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament  remains  animated  almost  exclusively  by 
domestic  political  issues;  no  democratic  European 
politics  have  emerged.  To  employ  Tönnies’  classical 
dichotomy, Europe  has  as  yet  remained  a “society” 
(Gesellschaft) of states seeking their own interests; it 
has  never  become  a  genuine  “community” 
(Gemeinschaft) where states would also look beyond 
their national interests.
21 
 
                                                      
21 See Ferdinand Tönnies. Community and Society (1887).  EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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With  the  prestige  of  the  European  model  arguably 
diminishing,  and  European  integration  stalling,  it  is 
useful perhaps also to reflect on the Asian model of 
regional cooperation, and see what lessons Asians can 
learn from the current crisis. After all, European crises 
show that, just like in Asia, consensus remains a must 
in  Europe.  Interests  (as they  are  perceived  by each 
nation) led, for example, Switzerland out of the EU 
(formally at least) and the United Kingdom out of the 
euro.  In  Asia,  likewise,  Indonesia  did  not adopt  the 
2002  ASEAN  Agreement  on  Transboundary  Haze 
Pollution,  ratified  by  eight  other  ASEAN  members 
following Sumatra’s wildfires. The states affected by 
haze  could  not  convince  Indonesia  to  recognize  its 
duty toward its neighbours. ASEAN might have also 
set up an Inter-governmental Commission on Human 
Rights, but real progress would be slow because of 
concerns over sovereignty.  The crisis in the euro zone 
however  revealed  too  that  –  the  EU  remains  an 
organization  of  independent  and  sovereign  states, 
ready to agree only to what they perceive in their own 
interest. 
 
Certainly,  quantitatively,  more  negotiations  are 
successful in Europe. No Asian sub-region is likely to 
establish  a  common  currency  any  time  soon.    In 
Europe,  economies  and  cultures  are  more 
interdependent  and  interrelated  than  in  any  Asian 
sub-region,  which  perhaps  explains  the  greater 
success of European transnational negotiations. There 
is no inherent superiority of the European model, but 
only  circumstantial  differences  in  the  possibility  of 
quid  pro  quo  arrangements  –  the  condition  for 
successful  negotiations.  In  Asia  as  in  Europe, 
negotiations  are  based  on  well-thought  through 
national interests, not on prevailing regional concerns; 
but, if Europe has not qualitatively gone further than 
Asia,  if  it  has  not  implemented  a  distinct  model  or 
invented a magic formula to achieve what could not 
be  achieved  otherwise,  why  should  Asia  get 
inspiration from Europe? 
 
B.  Considering  Asia’s  specific  regional 
circumstances vis-à-vis regional integration 
 
Can  Asian  and  European  integration  be  fruitfully 
compared?  Is it possible that the trajectory of Asian 
integration would be similar to that of Europe?  With 
different  historical  background  and  context  and 
differing visions of “integration”, it is unlikely that the 
Asians would simply adopt the European model.  Yet, 
the EU has never shied away from offering lessons to 
be learnt from the European integration process.   
 
Europe  is  constituted  by small  countries, which  are 
naturally more prone to pool their sovereignty as a 
strategy  to  better  defend  their  independence  in  a 
world  dominated  by  bigger  states.  European 
integration followed the initial experience of Benelux, 
an economic union initiated in 1944 by three small 
European  states  (Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands) totalling less than 20 million inhabitants. 
In contrast, Asia is constituted of very different states, 
in  size  and  power.  The  total  population  of  today’s 
EU27 represents less than the half of China’s or India’s 
population. Even in Southeast Asia, Indonesia alone is  
close to half of ASEAN’s population, while only one 
European citizen out of six is German (Germany being 
the most populous European state). Thus, each Asian 
sub-region is dominated by one (and only one) state, 
and  neither  South  Asia  nor  Northeast  Asia  is 
composed of a sufficient number of small states to 
balance the sub-regional hegemony of India and China 
respectively. Indeed, it may be argued that China and 
India  could  arguably  be  seen  as  the  outcome  of 
successful integration by other means, leading to the 
creation of extremely large states. When asked what 
China and India did to meet global challenges, Chinese 
and Indian representatives can put forward that “by 
taking  care  of  more  than  two  billion  people  –  and 
taking care of them well – both China and India were 
already making a major contribution to global stability 
and order”.
22 Yet, it may be that the countries at the 
periphery  of  China  and  India  have  largely  defined 
themselves,  as  fully  independent  states  within  the 
post Second World War world order, in opposition to 
China and India. 
 
In  addition,  Asia  and  its  sub-regions  lack  the  EU’s 
relative homogeneity. For instance, while Christianity 
has  played  an  integral  part  in  the  history  and 
traditions in each of the EU’s 27 member states, the 
ten  ASEAN  Member  states  are  divided  between 
predominantly  Buddhist  countries  (Cambodia,  Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam), predominantly Muslim 
countries  (Brunei,  Indonesia,  Malaysia),  Christian 
Philippines, and multi-religious Singapore. 
 
 Asia  also  does  not  necessarily  need  or  aspire  to 
achieve  the  same  end  point  as  Europe. 
Intergovernmental  cooperation  is  animated  by 
                                                      
22 Simon  Chesterman  &  Kishore  Mahbubani,  The  Asian  Way  of 
Handling the World, The Guardian, 4 March 2010.  EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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peoples’  complex  social  and  cultural  perception  of 
one another at least as much as rational thinking by 
academics  and  bureaucrats.  In  the  context  of 
economic  globalisation,  Asian  societies  will,  in  any 
case,  be  pushed  to  some  form  of  transnational 
cooperation.  It  may  appear  important  that  this 
economic  cooperation  includes  other  dimensions, 
such  as  the  protection  of  human  dignity  and  the 
fairness  of  the  relations  between  the  peoples.  Yet, 
there is no obvious reason why, for instance, Asian 
states should participate in one or several relatively 
closed  communities  of  states  rather  than,  say,  a 
complex set of commitments with different partners; 
why  treaties  should  be  ratified  rather  than 
declarations adopted (provided that declarations are 
implemented  as  frequently  as  treaties);  why  states 
should be the sole or the primary actor of the process; 
or  why  the  geographical  (instead  of,  for  instance, 
cultural  or  economic)  proximity  should  be  the 
strongest criteria to connect nations. 
 
In  the  context  of  Asian  sub-regions,  transnational 
courts,  bureaucracies  or  parliaments  are  simply 
inconceivable,  for  these  “independent”  institutions 
would either fall within the control of a sub-regional 
dominant power (India, China, Indonesia), or suppose 
agreements  that  are  unacceptable  for  these  sub-
regional dominant powers. Therefore, steps have to 
be taken in a consensual way, with – on all decisions – 
the consent of both major and minor powers. 
 
This  should  not  mean,  however,  that  there  is  no 
transnational cooperation in Asia. In Northeast Asia, 
for instance, despite the structural difficulty of coping 
with dominant China, states have engaged in specific 
forms  of  transnational  cooperation.  Beside  bilateral 
agreements with third states, Northeast Asian states 
also  participate  together  in  larger  transnational 
cooperation initiatives. ASEAN, in particular, has been 
a structuring institution since 1997, when the ASEAN 
Plus Three initiative included, at the same negotiating 
table,  China,  Japan  and  South  Korea.  Furthermore, 
current trade negotiations extend, beyond ASEAN, to 
India, Australia and New Zealand. In addition to this, 
Northeast  Asia  nations  are  also  engaging  in 
transnational cooperation, through the development 
of  institutions  whose  membership  is  not  limited  to 
states – thus avoiding the strong imbalance between 
China  and  its  neighbours.  For  instance,  the 
Association of Northeast Asia Regional Governments, 
an  international  organization  established  in  1996, 
encompasses 70 sub-national governments in China, 
Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia and South Korea. 
In other cases, informal forums such as the Northeast 
Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation may 
play a role in researching a sub-regional consensus. 
Lastly, transnational non-governmental organizations 
such  as  the  Northeast  Asia  Economic  Forum  also 
contribute  in  structuring  the  region  without  the 
participation of governments. 
 
The particularism of European integration 
 
The “European model” of regional integration is only 
one form of transnational cooperation out of others. 
One must keep its particularism in mind: its invention 
in  very  specific  historical  circumstances  in  Europe 
after  two  World  Wars;  its  support  from  the 
philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  and  the  federalist 
movement; its development from the first experience 
of the integration of three small European countries 
(the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) before its 
enlargement  to  include  three  larger  states;  the 
cultural proximity of Western countries. In fact, the 
reproduction  of  the  same  model  of  regional 
cooperation anywhere in Asia does not make much 
sense, at least because of the disproportion between 
sub-regional  dominating  powers  and  smaller  states. 
Each  region  needs  its  own  form  of  transnational 
governance. In Asia, this should certainly play with the 
European  institutional  repertoire  instead  of 
reinventing  the  wheel.  The  European  experience 
(instead of model) may be useful if a real comparison 
is drawn between the circumstances of both regions. 
 
III. The EU as a “Model” of Compliance with 
International Law 
 
In its relations with the larger world too, the EU has 
also set up itself as an exemplary model in principled 
multilateralism and abiding by international laws and 
standard.  Promoting  “universal  norms”  such  as 
human  rights,  democracy  and  emphasizing  good 
governance  and  sustainable  development  are  often 
seen as part of the EU’s contribution to global order, 
and  would  be  pursued  in  the  context  of  the  EU’s 
relations with Asia. It is often argued that the regional 
integration  of  European  states  within  the  EU,  the 
Council  of  Europe  or  even  the  Organization  for 
Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (OSCE),  has 
helped  developed  a  high  level  of  human  rights 
protection,  substantive  democracy,  “good” 
governance  and  ambitious  environmental  policies, 
and  hence  Asia  could  follow  the  path  of  global EUC Working Paper No. 7 
 
9 
 
integration  to  ratify  international  treaties  and 
implement these universal norms.   
 
This position seems to be based on two assumptions. 
Firstly, it is assumed that Europe does comply with 
international  law.  Secondly,  it  is  also  assumed  that 
Asia  and  Europe  are  in  an  analogous  relation  with 
regard to international law. However, objections can 
be raised with regard to both assumptions. Firstly, the 
EU has not systematically complied with international 
law  (A).  Secondly,  Asia  and  Europe  are  in  different 
situations regarding international law (B). 
 
A.  Reassessing  Europe’s  compliance  with 
international law 
 
European ideologies have often been hegemonic. The 
rights proclaimed in the 1789 French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen were not limited 
to a given regime or to a given country; its ambit was 
universal. Today, international negotiations reflect the 
European willingness to promote international rules 
on  climate  change  mitigation  and  labour  rights, 
amongst others. However, post-World War II Europe 
lost its hegemonic geopolitical influence. The United 
States, in particular, has gained a decisive influence on 
international  law.  Consequently,  European  states 
have  increasingly  been  subjected  to  international 
rules  which  they  did  not  actively  support  (even 
though they often formally agreed upon them), or, at 
least,  whose  details  did  not  entirely  conform  to 
prevailing European ideologies. 
 
Two recent cases judged by the ECJ reflected such a 
conflict  between  international  law  and  European 
values: Kadi and ATA. 
 
Kadi  concerns  the  sanctions  adopted  by  the  UN 
Security  Council  against  international  terrorism.  Mr 
Kadi  argued  that  an  EU  regulation  implementing 
Security  Council  sanctions  violated  several  of  its 
fundamental rights protected by EU law. In 2005, the 
Court of First Instance recalled that international law 
prevails over regional law: 
 
pursuant both to the rules of general international law 
and  to  the  specific  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  Member 
statesmay,  and  indeed  must,  leave  unapplied  any 
provision  of  Community  law  […]  that  raises  any 
impediment  to  the  proper  performance  of  their 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
23 
                                                      
23 Kadi-I CFI, supra note 16, para. 190. 
According to the Court of First Instance, the European 
Community, although not a party to the UN Charter, is 
“bound by the obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations in the same way as its Member States, 
by  virtue  of  the  Treaty  establishing  it”.
24 In  other 
words, the UN Charter  – and the sanctions taken by 
the  Security  Council  in  application  of  the  Charter  – 
bind  the  European  institutions  “to  adopt  all  the 
measures necessary to enable its Member states to 
fulfil [their] obligations” under the UN Charter.
25 The 
Court further underscored that “[a]ny review of the 
internal  lawfulness  of  the  contested  regulation  […] 
would  […]  imply  that  the  Court  is  to  consider, 
indirectly,  the  lawfulness  of  [the  SC]  resolutions”.
26 
While it did not reject judicial review on its principle, 
the court limited this control to the “lawfulness of the 
resolutions of  the  Security  Council  in  question  with 
regard  to  jus  cogens  [“compelling,”  quasi-universal 
norms of international law]”
27 – an extremely narrow 
control which, in the case at issue, did not seriously 
challenge the regulations at issue. In other words, for 
the Court of First Instance, the European system was 
(almost) completely bound by the UN legal order: the 
European  institutions  “had  no  autonomous 
discretion”  in  the  implementation  of  the  UN 
sanctions.
28 
 
But Mr Kadi appealed, and the Grand Chamber of the 
ECJ drew very different conclusions. Its judgment, in 
2008, annulled the  regulation at  issue. Unlike the 
Court of First Instance, the ECJ considered that EU law 
forms “an autonomous legal system which is not to be 
prejudiced  by  an  international  agreement”.
29 
Therefore,  it  concluded  that  European  law’s 
deference to international treaties 
 
May in no circumstances permit any challenge  to the 
principles that form part of the very foundations of the 
Community legal order, one of which is the protection 
of  fundamental  rights,  including  the  review  by  the 
Community judicature of the lawfulness of Community 
measures  as  regards  their  consistency  with  those 
fundamental rights.
30 
 
                                                      
24 Id. para. 193. 
25 Id. para. 204. 
26 Id. paras. 214, 215. 
27 Id. para. 226. 
28 Id. at para. 214. 
29 Id. para. 316. 
30 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. 
Council and Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 [hereinafter Kadi-I ECJ], 
para. 304. EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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In  other  words,  the  primacy  of  international  law 
“would not [...] extend to primary law, in particular to 
the  general  principles  of  which  fundamental  rights 
form  part”.
31  Accordingly,  in  case  of  a  conflict 
between an international norm binding the EU and a 
norm of the European treaty, for instance relative to 
“the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms”,
32  the 
European norm prevails – in the European legal order 
– over its international counterpart.  
 
But  the  story  does  not  end  there.  Applying  the 
previous judgment, the Commission sent a letter to 
Mr Kadi with a brief summary of the grounds for the 
sanctions against him, but it did not remove him from 
the  sanction  list.  Therefore,  Mr  Kadi  seized  the 
General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) 
anew,  asking  for  the  disclosure  of  “all  of  the 
documents relating to the adoption of the contested 
regulation”  and  the  interruption  of  the  sanctions 
against  him.
33 This time, in a j udgment adopted in 
2010,  the  General  Court  accepted  to  control  the 
conformity  of  UN  sanctions  with  EU  fundamental 
principles, although in quite a nonchalant manner. It 
annulled the new regulation at issue in so far as it 
concerns Mr Kadi. In this judgment,   however, the 
General Court openly criticized the Court of Justice’s 
Judgment. It put forward that 
 
Once  it  is  accepted  that  the  Security  Council  has 
inherent  competence  to  adopt  sanctions  targeted  at 
individuals rather than at States or their governments 
(smart sanctions), such judicial review [as commanded 
by the European Court of Justice] is liable to encroach 
on the Security Council’s prerogatives, in particular with 
regard to determining who or what constitutes a threat 
to international peace or security, to finding that such a 
threat  exists  and  to  determining  the  measures 
necessary to put an end to it.
34 
 
The  General  Court went  further  to  underscore  that 
“certain doubts may have been voiced in legal circles 
as to whether the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Kadi is wholly consistent with [...] international law”.
35 
More explicitly, it argued that “the Court of Justice [...] 
seems to have regarded the constitutional framework 
created  by  the  EC  Treaty  as  a  wholly  autonomous 
legal  order,  not  subject  to  the  higher  rules  of 
                                                      
31 Id. para. 308. 
32 Id. para. 303. 
33 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-___ (30 Sep.), nyr 
[hereinafter Kadi-II GC], para. 71. 
34 Id. para. 114. 
35 Id. para. 115. 
international law – in this case the law deriving from 
the Charter of the United Nations”.
36 Yet, complying 
with the “hierarchical judicial structure,” it however 
suggested that 
 
if an answer is to be given to the questions raised by the 
institutions [about the validity of the Court of Justice’s 
judgment in Kadi], Member states and interested legal 
quarters following the judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Kadi, it is for the Court of Justice itself to provide that 
answer in the context of future cases before it.
37 
 
The Commission and the Council have appealed this 
judgment before the ECJ. Soon, a decision in Kadi-II is 
expected from the ECJ, which will either uphold, or 
reform its judgment in Kadi-I. 
 
The  ECJ  in  Kadi-I  derogated  from  international  law 
with gusto to protect human rights; but the General 
Court appeared more reserved. Two conceptions of 
the relation between EU and international law clashed: 
the constitutionalism of the European Court of Justice 
and  the  monism  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  / 
General Court. 
 
Beside Kadi, the ECJ faced similar questions in ATA. In 
its judgment adopted on 21 December 2011, it took 
an approach remarkably different from Kadi. Instead 
of an explicit decision to derogate from international 
rules, the ECJ used delicate legal subtleties to uphold 
a  controversial  European  directive.  The  case 
concerned the extension of the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme, a system whereby states auction compulsory 
allowances to emit greenhouse gas, to civil air carriers. 
Strong  concerns  had  been  expressed  through 
diplomatic  media  and,  as  the  EU  Commission  and 
Council  persisted,  the  Air  Transport  Association  of 
America  and  three  large  American  air  carriers 
challenged the directive at issue. The ECJ upheld the 
directive, which entered into force on 1 January 2012, 
ten days after the release of the judgment. 
 
The main argument of the American air carriers was 
that  the  Chicago  Convention  on  International  Civil 
Aviation  prohibited  “airport  and  similar  charges”.
38 
Yet, a difficulty with this argument is that, while all 27 
EU  m ember  states  are  parties  to  the  Chicago 
                                                      
36 Id. para. 119. 
37 Id. para. 121. 
38 Convention on Civil Aviation art. 15, 7 Dec. 1944 , 15 U.N.T.S. 
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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Convention, the EU itself has not ratified it.
39 However, 
the American air carriers relied on article 351 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[“TFEU”], providing that “rights and obligations arising 
from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 [...] 
between  one  or  more  Member  states  on  the  one 
hand, and one or more third countries on the other, 
shall  not  be  affected”
 by  European  integration.
40 In 
accordance with its well-settled case-law, the ECJ may 
(and arguably should) therefore have considered that 
no provision of EU law should prevent Member states 
from respecting their obligation not to impose any 
“airport and similar charges” upon civil air carriers.
41 
This exact reasoning was applied by the Court of First 
Instance in its 2005 judgment in Kadi-I, for instance.
42 
 
Instead,  however,  the  ECJ  decided  to  rely  on  an 
ambiguous  sentence  of  the  1980  Burgoa  case, 
according  to  which  article  351  TFEU  (at  the  time, 
article 234 TCE) “does not bind the [EU] as regards the 
third States party to that agreement.”
43 From this, the 
ECJ quickly went on to conclude that the EU did not 
incur  any  duty  from  the  Chicago  Convention.  Yet, 
Burgoa  also  clearly  identified  (in  the  previous 
sentence of the same paragraph!) a “duty on the part 
of  the  institutions  of  the  [EU]  not  to  impede  the 
performance  of  the  obligations  of  Member  states 
which  stem  from  a  prior  agreement”.
44  As  a 
consequence of this duty, recognized in  Burgoa  as 
well as in several later judgments of the ECJ, the EU 
should  have  concluded  that  a  pre-existing 
international norm binding EU member states should 
prevail over an act of the EU. Thus, at this point, the 
ECJ  decided  discretely  to  evade  its  own  case-laws, 
through a reference to a truncated sentence of an old 
judgment. 
 
In fact, at this point and others of the same judgment, 
the ECJ seeks mainly to avoid any direct confrontation 
between  the  European  legal  regime  and  the 
                                                      
39 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, 2011 ECR I-___ (21 Dec.), nyr, para. 
60. 
40 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union  art.  1 5,  5  Sep.  2008,  2008  0.J.  (C  115)  47 
[hereinafter TFEUJ]. The Chicago Convention was ratified in 1944, 
hence it pre-existed to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. 
41 Chicago Convention, supra note 38, art. 15. 
42 Kadi-I CFI, supra note 16, para. 186. The Court of Justice avoided 
to take a position on whether or not the conditions for application 
of art. 307 (now 351) were met: see Kadi-I ECJ, supra note 30, 
para. 301. 
43 Case 812/79, Attorney Gen. v. Burgoa, 1980 E.C.R. 2787, para. 9. 
44 Id. 
international  legal  order.
45 As the EU is   party to a 
transatlantic Open Skies Agreement, the provisions of 
which are often analogous to the Chicago Convention, 
the ECJ resorts to very constructive interpretations. It 
concludes  for  instance  that  the  issuance  of 
compulsory carbon allowances does not fall within the 
resolutely comprehensive prohibition of “taxes, levies, 
duties, fees and charges”,
46 nor even within the even 
wider prohibition of “fees, dues or other charges”,
47 
simply because it is a market-based measure. 
 
Thus, the ECJ in ATA avoided any explicit justification 
of  a  derogation to  international  law.  An  alternative 
argumentation,  without  truncated  references  to  an 
old  judgment  or  restrictive  interpretation  of 
purposefully broad prohibitions, could – and, one may 
argue, should – have followed an approach similar to 
the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi: climate change mitigation 
(which appeared to be the ultimate purpose of the 
emission  trading  scheme)  or,  more  broadly, 
environmental  protection  and  sustainable 
development, could have been considered as another 
of  the  “very  foundations  of  the  Community  legal 
order”.
48 
 
If a Kadi-like solution in ATA would have been more 
sensible  from  a  lawyer’s  perspective,  it  would 
however have been less acceptable politically for the 
international partners of Europe. Some international 
lawyers would argue that the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi is 
little more than an arbitrary decision self-authorizing 
the  EU  not  to  respect  its  international  obligations. 
Apparently  any  rule  could  be  derogated  through 
invoking  such  “fundamental”  norms  internal  to  the 
European legal regime. However, to play the role of 
the devil’s advocate, a closer view shows that the ECJ 
                                                      
45 See  Benoît  Mayer,  annotation,  Case  C-366/10,  Air  Transport 
Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change (unpublished manuscript). 
46 Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Member States of the European Union art. 11(2), 30 Apr. 
2007, OJEU 2007 L -134/4, as amended by it protocol, 25 Aug. 
2010, OJEU 2010 L-223/4 [hereinafter Open Skies Agreement]. See 
also Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, supra note 39, paras. 136-147. 
47 Chicago Convention, supra note 38, art. 15. The EU is bound by 
this provision of the Chicago Convention in application of Open 
Skies Agreement, art. 3(4), supra note 46. See Air Transport Ass’n 
of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change, supra note 
39, para. 153. 
48 Kadi-I  ECJ,  supra  note  30,  para.  304.  See  generally:  Benoît 
Mayer,  (2012)  49  Common  Market  Law  Review  (forthcoming), 
note on case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and 
Others  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  Energy  and  Climate  Change, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011. EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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does  not  allow  any  derogation  from  international 
rules. In Kadi, international rules were in open conflict 
with  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights,  a  core 
principle of the EU. In fact, the European courts were 
not  the  only  jurisdictions  to  worry  about  the 
compatibility  of  UN  “smart”  sanctions  with  the 
international  human  rights  project.  Kadi-I  was 
preceded or followed by similar judgments adopted 
by  domestic  jurisdictions.
49 UN human rights bodies 
too called the attention of the Security Council on its 
human  rights  obligations.
50 Article  103  of  the  UN 
Charter  affirms  that  states’  obligations  under  the 
Charter  shall  prevail  over  any  other  international 
agreement, but human rights norms are sometimes of 
a customary nature and, generally, recognized within 
the  UN  legal  regime.
51 Indeed, the Security Council 
itself recognized many times that states 
 
Must  ensure  that  any  measures  taken  to  combat 
terrorism  comply  with  all  their  obligations  under 
international law, and should adopt such measures in 
accordance  with  international  law,  in  particular 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian 
law.
52 
 
In ATA, also, the ECJ could have justified a derogation 
of  international  rules  on  the  ground  that  the 
imperative of climate change mitigation has become, 
                                                      
49 E.g.,  judgment  of  3  Nov.  2004,  No.  262626,  French  Conseil 
d’Etat  10/9  SSR;  R  v.  Sec’y  of  State  for  Def.  [2007]  UKHL  58; 
Abdelrazik  v.  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Attorney  Gen., 
Federal Court of Canada, 2009 FC 580. 
50 See Human Rights Commmittee, views on Communication No. 
1472/2006,  Nabil  Sayadi  and  Patricia  Vinck  v.  Belgium, 
Communication  No.  1472/2006,  U.N.  Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008); Human Rights Council, Universal 
Periodic Review, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, U.N. 
Doc.  CCPR/CO/73/UK  (2001);  ---  Universal  Periodic  Review, 
Concluding  Observations:  New  Zealand,  U.N.  Doc. 
CCPR/CO/75/NZL  (2002);  ---,  Universal  Periodic  Review, 
Concluding  Observations:  Yemen,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/CO/75/MDA 
(2002);  ---, Universal Periodic Review, Concluding Observations: 
Estonia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/77/EST (2003) ; ---, Universal Periodic 
Review:  New  Zealand,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/NZL/CO/5  (2010);  ---, 
Universal  Periodic  Review:  Israel,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 
(2010); UN Committee Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003  (2005),  para.  13.1;  UN  Committee  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  General  Comment  8,  The 
relationship  between  economic  sanctions  and  respect  for 
economic,  social  and  cultural  rights,  U.N.  Doc.  E/C.12/1997/8 
(1997). 
51 See Charter of the United Nations, art. 103,  supra note 8. For 
the recognition of human rights within the Charter, see id. second 
recital and art. 1(2). 
52 S.C. Res. 1456 (2003), 1535 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1624 (2005), 
1787 (2007), 1805 (2008) and 1963 (2010).  See  also  Security 
Council resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011).  
in the EU at least, a fundamental rule. Thus, it could 
have pushed for a better inclusion of environmental 
standards  in  international  air  law.  Instead,  the  ECJ 
decided to take a low profile and justified its decision, 
as far as possible, on technical grounds and in regional 
law.  Rather  than  subordinating  the  authority  of 
international  law  to  its  conformity  with  European 
principles,  the  ECJ  dealt  with  technical  issues  of 
recognition, in the EU legal regime, of norms formally 
binding  its  member  states.  While  the  ECJ’s 
isolationism in Kadi-I was affirmed as a strong political 
stand  –  that  not  anything  could  be  accepted  as 
binding  international  law  –  ATA’s  isolationism  was 
presented  as  an  unfortunate  consequence  of  legal 
technicalities. 
 
Nonetheless, ATA’s apparently accidental conclusions 
do  not  hold  much  water.  The  directive  at  issue, 
extending the EU Emission Trading Scheme to aviation 
activities,  is  far  from  presenting  its  extraterritorial 
effects as accidental. This directive was adopted only 
after  (and  as  a  consequence  of)  the  failure  of 
multilateral  negotiations  carried  out  within  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization,  as  were 
suggested by the Kyoto Protocol.
53 In view of the likely 
failure of international negotiations, the EU decided 
to initiate global efforts through a first regional step. 
The directive leaves no doubt about the EU’s intent to 
put  pressure  over  multilateral  negotiations  –  only 
such  an activist  posture  explains  that  the European 
Emission Trading Scheme was extended to the whole 
flights arriving in or departing from the EU, including 
sections  of  those  flights  that  occur  outside  of  the 
European territory. The very language of the directive 
at issue highlights that “[t]he Community scheme may 
serve  as  a  model  for  the  use  of  emissions  trading 
worldwide”,
54 and calls the EU and its member states 
to  “continue  to  seek  an  agreement  on  global 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation”.
55 
 
Kadi  and  ATA  would  not  have  attracted  the  same 
degree of interest if they had been decided only by 
                                                      
53 Kyoto  Protocol  art.  2(2),  11  Dec.  1997,  2303  UNTS  148.  See 
Directive  2008/101/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading  within  the  Community,  8
th  and  9
th  recitals  [hereinafter 
Directive 2008/101]. 
54 Directive 2008/101, id., 17
th recital. 
55 Id. See also Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  establishing  a  scheme  for  greenhouse  gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, as amended by 
directive 2008/101, art. 25(a). EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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national  jurisdictions  in  a  domestic  context.  The 
geopolitical significance of Kadi and ATA stems from 
their  authority  over  a  large  and  influential  regional 
organization.  Two  of  the  EU  member  states  are 
permanent members of the Security Council, and the 
EU’s economy, taken as a single entity, is the largest 
economy in the world. In these circumstances, the ECJ 
decision, in Kadi, not to comply with Security Council 
sanctions  that  go  against  fundamental  rights,  was 
likely to be an influential push for a reform of these 
sanctions.  In  fact,  following  the  ECJ’s  judgment  in 
2005,  the  Security  Council  adopted  a  series  of 
resolutions  aiming  at  reconciling  “smart”  sanctions 
and fundamental rights: 
 
-  Resolution  1617  (2008)  defining  the  criteria  for 
inclusion  of  individuals  and  entities  on  the 
sanctions list and demanding that states proposing 
a new name justify their proposal.
56 
-  Resolution  1730  (2006)  establishing  a  “de-listing 
procedure”  to  be  initiated  on  the  request  of 
sanctioned individuals or entities. 
-  Resolution  1735  (2006)  demanding  that  a  state 
proposing new names for inclusion on the sanction 
list should “provide a statement of the case.”
57  
-  Resolution  1822  (2008)  providing  more  specific 
information and guarantees to listed individuals or 
entities. 
-  Resolution  1904  (2009)  establishing  an 
ombudsperson  to  facilitate  the  de-listing 
procedure. 
-  Resolution 1988 (2011) encouraging the Sanctions 
Committee  “to  remove  expeditiously  individuals 
and  entities  on  a  case-by-case  basis”  when  they 
stop meeting defined criteria.
58 
 
The  ECJ’s  decision  in  ATA,  although  justifying 
European isolationism in much weaker terms, is also 
likely to have significant international consequences. 
Following  the  judgment,  the  US  House  of 
Representatives supported a bill to prevent American 
air  carriers  from  participating  in  the  European 
scheme,
59 the four main Chinese airlines announced 
that they would not pay any carbon charge,
60 and the 
African Airline Association expressed its hostility to 
                                                      
56 S.C. Res. 1617 (2005), para. 2, 3. 
57 S.C. Res. 1735 (2006), para. 5. 
58 S.C. Res. 1988 (2011), para. 18. 
59 Id. 
60 Jonathan Watts, Chinese airlines refuse to pay EU carbon tax, 
THE GUARDIAN, 4 Jan. 2012.  
the  scheme.
61  Similarly,  shortly  after  the 
Commission’s  released  its  proposal  for  a  regional 
scheme,
62 the General Assembly of the International 
Civil  Aviation  Organization  adopte d  frankly  hostile 
language,  “urg[ing]  Contracting  States  not  to 
implement  an  emissions  trading  system  on  another 
Contracting  State’s  aircraft  operators except  on  the 
basis of mutual agreement between those States”.
63 
In  2010,  however,  the  same  organ  repelled  this 
resolution  and  adopted  another  one,  which 
mentioned  the  possibility  that  market-based 
measures  be  “established  on  national,  regional  and 
global levels”,
64 and it adopted “guiding principles for 
the  design  and  implementation  of  market-based 
measures  (MBMs)  for  international  aviation”.
65 
Moreover,  the  American  Air  Transport  Association 
spectacularly  softened  its  position  on  multilateral 
negotiations and, in 2011, it declared itself “part of an 
industrywide aviation coalition that has committed to 
continuing  the  industry’s  strong  record  of  GHG 
emissions savings and has proposed the adoption of a 
global  sectoral  approach  by  the  International  Civil 
Aviation Organization”.
66 
 
Although using different methods, both Kadi and ATA 
cases  gave  rise  to  the  perception  that  the  EU  is 
becoming  isolationist  and/or  protectionist.  Kadi,  on 
the one hand, pushes for sanctions more consistent 
with  international  human  rights  standards  through 
explicitly derogating from international rules. ATA, on 
the  other  hand,  indirectly  advocates  for  climate 
change  mitigation  in  international  civil  aviation 
activities through adventurous interpretation of legal 
documents. In each case, one may wonder whether 
the end justifies the means. A formal argument from 
the  perspective  of  international  law  would  reject 
Kadi’s constitutionalism as surely as ATA’s convoluted 
                                                      
61 Fredrick  Obura,  African  airlines  oppose  EU  emissions  trading 
scheme, THE STANDARD, 15 Jan. 2012. 
62 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allow ance 
trading within the Community of 20 December 2006, COM(2006) 
818 final. 
63  ICAO  Assembly  Res.  A36-22,  Consolidated  statement  of 
continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental 
protection, appendix L, article 1(b)(1). 
64  ICAO  Assembly  Res.   A37-19,  Consolidated  statement  of 
continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental 
protection, art. 15(a). 
65 Id., annex. 
66 Air Transport Association Comment on the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme  Preliminary  Opinion ,  6  Oct.  2011,  available  at: 
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/ATA-Comment-on-the-EU-
Emissions-Trading-Scheme-Preliminary-Opinion.aspx  EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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exegesis.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  one 
understands only too well the wariness of the EU (or 
any state in the same position), otherwise unable to 
protect fundamental rights or the global environment 
because of international rules. 
 
Indeed, a reasonable critique of Kadi and ATA could 
be that the ECJ did not seek to justify the exclusion of 
international rules on the basis of other international 
norms  (instead  of  regional  norms).  In  both  cases, 
good  arguments  might  have  been  found  in 
international law to derogate from the rules that the 
ECJ  decided  not  to  apply.  In  Kadi,  after  all,  as  was 
recalled, even UN human rights bodies had expressed 
some concerns about the conformity of UN Security 
Council  sanctions  with  international  human  rights 
norms, and these international human rights norms 
were constantly recalled by the Security Council itself. 
On the other hand, international environmental law 
contains a host of principles and rules, ranging from 
the  no-harm  principle
67 to  the  duty  of  developed 
states to take the lead in climate change mitigation,
68 
to  which  the  ECJ  could  have  resorted.  Such 
constructive  interpretations  are  certainly  less 
detrimental  to  international  law  than  its  mere 
exclusion,  by  a  regio nal  court,  on  the  ground  of 
regional norms. 
 
Taken  as  they  are,  Kadi  and  ATA  do  not  form  a 
“model”  of  compliance  with  international  law  that 
Asia  and  the  Third  World  generally  should  follow. 
They  seem  to  suggest  that  international  law  is  not 
much more than institutionalised relations of power 
between  nations,  some  allowed  to  deviate  from  it, 
while others have to comply. They show that central 
states do not need to comply with international law 
nor  even  to  justify  their  rejection  of  international 
norms  on  an  international  legal  ground.  Thus,  Kadi 
and  ATA  at  least  could  potentially  undermine  the 
European  call  on  Asian  states  to  comply  with 
international  law.  They  show  that  Europe  has  been 
accorded a leeway that is not generally given to Asia, 
and, as a consequence, an influence that Asia does 
not have. 
 
                                                      
67 E.g., United States of America v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 
(Mixed  Arbitral  Tribunal,  1941);  Stockholm  Declaration  on  the 
Human Environment, 16 Jun. 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416; Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, 3-14 Jun. 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874. 
68 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 
2(a), 3(3), 4(2)(a), 14 Jun. 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
B. Considering Asia’s specific regional circumstances 
vis-à-vis international law 
 
Another  objection  to  the  notion  of  a  “European 
model”  of  compliance  with  international  law  is 
therefore that Asia and Europe are not in analogous 
situations  regarding  international  law.  International 
legal standards (unlike bilateral or regional treaties) 
are mainly based on the assumption that all states are 
in  an  equal  position.  The  models  of  human  rights, 
democracy  or  good  governance  are  expressed  as 
universal  rules.  At  most,  some  of  these  rules  take 
specific  national  circumstances  into  account.  Thus, 
while  international  law  calls  social,  economic  and 
cultural rights universal, it recognizes that states with 
different  levels  of  development  may  have  different 
degree  of  obligations.  Regarding  climate  change 
mitigation,  international  law  recognizes  the 
ambiguous  “common  but  differentiated 
responsibilities”
69 of  all  states;  practically  speaking, 
this has long meant that only developed states had 
quantified goals of climate change mitigation.
70 
 
Yet, on a host of other questions, international law 
remains  blind  to  obvious  differences.  Differences 
between  Asia  and  Europe  start  at  the  stage  of 
international law-making. European states are better 
represented on the world stage diplomatically. The 
EU’s half a billion inhabitants are represented at the 
Security Council by two permanent members (France 
and the UK); other states may apply to the two non-
permanent  seats  open  to  “Western  European  and 
other”  states  or  to  the  seat  open  to  “Eastern 
European” states. In contrast, Asia, with a population 
of  nearly  four  billion  inhabitants,  has  only  one 
permanent seat (China) and two non-permanent seats. 
An integrated Europe, able to speak as one, further 
deepens the gap with a fragmented Asia. Too often, 
international law looks like a flow of norms imposed 
by Western states to Eastern ones. A contrario, the 
1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Member of their Families, 
one  of  the  few  multilateral  treaties  sponsored  by 
developing  countries,  has  not  been  ratified  by  any 
developed country. 
 
At the stage of implementing international rules, Asia 
certainly  has  less  influence  than  Europe.  The 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  for  instance, 
                                                      
69 Id. 6th recital, art. 3(1) and art. 4(1). 
70  See  Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 11 Dec. 1997, 2303 UNTS 148. EUC Working Paper No. 7 
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would hesitate before imposing alone in Greece the 
same drastic conditions it imposed on several Asian 
states during the 1997 financial crisis. 
 
Moreover, identical norms implemented in the same 
manner in all countries may result in fundamentally 
unequal  conditions  for  developing  ones.  Some 
economists  argue  that  trade  measures  result  in 
unjustifiable results in the Third World. But the most 
striking  imbalance  between  Western  and  Asian 
countries lies in their different capacity of resistance. 
Few Asian states would risk themselves to explicitly 
derogate from Security Council resolution as the ECJ 
did. In other words, Asian states appeared to be more 
the target of “international” criticisms.  
 
International law, even more than any other form of 
law, cannot be understood without this context of an 
underlying realities of power play – not all states are 
equally constrained to comply with international law. 
The EU may unilaterally, for better or worse, decide 
that an international rule is not good enough to be 
implemented in Europe; but the same decision from a 
developing  country  in  Asia  may  lead  to  certain 
punitive action or the decline of strategic partnerships. 
 
Strengthening  the  international  legitimacy  of 
international law 
 
The  “European  model”  of  compliance  with 
international law is a specific and contextual model, 
which  struggles  to  find  some  coherence.  Asia  is 
definitely not in a similar position, for it has a much 
lower ability to (explicitly) reject international rules or 
to contribute in their determination. To this extent, 
the project of international law should be articulated 
and affirmed in the same way in Europe and in Asia. 
The ECJ did raise some fundamental objections on the 
contradictions  between  Security  Council  sanctions 
and  human  rights  or  between  international  air  law 
and  climate  change  mitigation.  However,  deciding 
these  matters  in  a  regional  context  sends  a  wrong 
message – an affirmation that international law is an 
instrument of domination rather than a prevailing rule, 
a  real  jus  cogens.  I  argue  that  constitutionalism  is 
necessary, but should be developed on the basis of 
international  law  rather  than  within  an  isolated 
regional legal regime. The protection of human rights 
and the environment are fundamental norms, in Asia 
just  like  in  Europe.  Certainly,  allowing  domestic 
jurisdictions to interrogate the validity of international 
rules  may  weaken  those  rules,  but  it  may  also 
strengthen  the  legitimacy  of  an  international  legal 
order.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
There is a certain arrogance in the affirmation that 
a “European model” of regional integration and of 
compliance  with  international  law  should  be 
adopted  anywhere  in  the  world,  and  in  Asia  in 
particular. This article argues on the contrary that 
Asia  and  Europe  are  in  fundamentally  different 
situations vis-à-vis international law. Based on an 
analysis  of  recent  events  and  latest  legal 
developments  in  Europe,  it  puts  the  “European 
model” of regional integration and the European 
selective  compliance  with  international  law  in 
perspective  with  regard  to  the  Asian  context. 
Without  denying  that  “civilizations”  should  learn 
from  one  another  and  that  the  European 
experience may be relevant to some extent in Asia, 
this article concludes that the tools developed in 
Europe should be used differently in Asia. 
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